In this paper, we consider a typical voting situation where a group of agents show their preferences over a set of alternatives. Under our approach, such preferences are codified into individual positional values which can be aggregated in several ways through particular functions, yielding positional voting rules and providing a social result in each case. We show that scoring rules belong to such class of positional voting rules. But if we focus our interest on OWA operators as aggregation functions, other well-known voting systems naturally appear. In particular, we determine those ones verifying duplication (i.e., clone irrelevance) and present a proposal of an overall social result provided by them.
Introduction
There exists in Social Choice a long tradition controversy between the positional and non-positional approaches to voting theory, coming early from Our proposal is based on aggregation functions, mainly through OWA operators 3 . This tool has been revealed as a unifying way to face different issues appearing in several fields, Social Choice Theory among them (on this particular matter, see Wang et al. [46] , Llamazares [35] , García-Lapresta et al. [21] and Kacprzyk et al. [30] , among others). As will be shown along the paper, this approach sheds light on some aspects avoided in the scoring context 4 .
One of these interesting properties, not satisfied by the scoring rules, is duplication. This property entails irrelevance of clone voters in the final outcome and might not seem suitable at all in voting scenarios. Nonetheless, its fulfillment should be convenient in several contexts; for example, when multiple votes are allowed for each voter (what happens if some Internet mechanisms are used)
or whenever that streams of opinion, rather than individual opinions, should be taken into account. Even more, it will be established that duplication arises in some specific positional voting rules induced by OWA operators interestingly related to decision under complete ignorance.
It is worth pointing out that there exist in the literature other possible alternative approaches extending the framework of scoring rules, such as flexible scoring rules introduced by Baharad and Nitzan [1] . On their hand, Xia and Conitzer [54, 55] have proposed what they call generalized scoring rules, extending well known voting rules such as Copeland, maximin, Bucklin and, of course, scoring rules. And recently Llamazares and Peña [36, 37] have employed cumulative standing functions representing in an interesting comprehensive way scoring rules such as plurality, antiplurality, Borda rule, k-approval voting, etc.
Even more, these last authors also include in their proposal other voting rules based on variable scoring vectors or taking into account the support behind the candidates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic notation for the voters' preferences over the alternatives and their related positions. Section 3 is devoted to voting rules as aggregation functions; we show that scoring rules are specific cases of such positional rules, and then we focus our attention on OWA operators and show their connections with some well-known voting rules appearing in the literature. The need of taking into account a variable electorate leads us to use extended OWA operator s (EOWA operators) and, with this background, in Section 4 we define duplication and then we characterize those OWA-generated positional voting rules satisfying this property. An illustrative example is also presented, and a proposal of an overall social order based on the characterized rules is obtained in a unifying way. Finally, some concluding remarks are included in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Consider a set of voters V = {1, . . . , m}, with m ≥ 2 (occasionally, just for completion reasons, we will also consider the trivial case m = 1). These voters show their preferences on a set of alternatives X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, with n ≥ 2.
With L(X) we denote the set of linear orders on X, and with W (X) the set of weak orders (or complete preorders) on X. Given R, ∈ W (X), with and ∼ we denote the asymmetric and the symmetric parts of R, respectively.
A profile is a vector R = (R 1 , . . . , R m ) of weak orders, where R v represents the preferences of the voter v ∈ V . Vectors in R n are denoted as a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
Given a, b ∈ R n , with a ≤ b we mean a i ≤ b i for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
It is worth mentioning that this proposal of assessing positions to the alternatives is equivalent to the way of scoring in extended versions of the Borda count for weak orders, where the scores of the tied alternatives are obtained as the average of the corresponding ones after a linearization process (see Smith [42] , Black [8] and Cook and Seiford [14] ).
Then,
Consequently, R is codified by the positions vector
, p(x 6 ), p(x 7 )) = (6, 4, 2.5, 2.5, 6, 6, 1).
In the particular case of linear orders, positions for each alternative vary from 1 to n with step 1 and the coordinates of each positions vector are permutations of P l = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In the general case of weak orders, it is easy to check that possible positions range from 1 to n with step 0.5, i.e., in this case the positional vectors take their coordinates in
although not all n-dimensional vectors with these values as coordinates do represent a weak order 5 .
Taking into account the positions of the alternatives, every profile R ∈ W (X) m has associated a position matrix containing the positions of the alternatives for all the voters 1. Anonymity: For every permutation π on {1, . . . , m} and every profile
2. Neutrality: For every permutation σ on {1, . . . , n} and every profile R ∈ D,
where R σ v and (F (R 1 , . . . , R m )) σ are the orders obtained from R v and
. . , R m ), respectively, by relabeling the alternatives according to σ,
3. Unanimity: For every profile R ∈ D and all x i , x j ∈ X,
Anonymity means a symmetric consideration for the voters; neutrality means a symmetric consideration for the alternatives; and unanimity means that if all the individuals consider an alternative as good as another one, then the social preference coincides with the individual preferences on this issue.
The previous framework considering voting rules, where the outcome is a social order (as in Smith [42] ), is not unique at all in Social Choice Theory.
Other possible approaches can be taken into account, such as social choice correspondences, where the result is the (nonempty) subset of the best alternatives (as in Young [52, 53] ; see also Laslier [31] for further rank-based and pairwisebased approaches), or even social choice functions, where a single alternative is assigned to each profile 6 .
Aggregation functions
In our proposal, we have adapted the notion of aggregation function from [7, 6] and Grabisch et al. [27] .
l . An aggregation function on D is a mapping A : D −→ R verifying the following conditions:
1. Boundary conditions: A(1, . . . , 1) = 1 and A(n, . . . , n) = n.
Monotonicity
If, additionally, A satisfies idempotency, i.e., A(a, . . . , a) = a for every a ∈ P (resp. a ∈ P l ), then A is called averaging aggregation function.
It is easy to see that averaging aggregation functions satisfy compensativeness:
Typical averaging aggregation functions are the arithmetic mean, trimmed means, the median, the maximum, the minimum, etc. In fact, we can gather all these aggregation functions as specific cases of OWA operators.
and a weighting vector w of dimension m, the OWA operator on D associated with w is the mapping A w :
where a [i] is the i-th greatest number of a 1 , . . . , a m .
As noted before, some well-known aggregation functions are specific cases of OWA operators.
With appropriate weighting vectors w = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) we obtain 
• . . . .
The median:
6. The mid-range, for w = (0.5, 0, . . . , 0, 0.5).
For m = 3, the set of weighting vectors Figure 1 ). Note that the vertices of the triangle, (0, 0), (1, 0) and (0, 1), correspond to the minimum, the maximum and the median, respectively; and the baricenter of the triangle, , corresponds to the arithmetic mean.
Positional voting rules
Definition 6. Given the aggregation function A : P m −→ R and a profile R ∈ W (X) m , the aggregated position of the alternative x i ∈ X is defined as
For every aggregation function A : P m −→ R, we consider the mapping
, where
Remark 1. In the previous situation, it is easy to check that F A is a voting rule.
Definition 7.
For every aggregation function A : P m −→ R, F A is the positional voting rule associated with A.
Scoring rules as positional voting rules
As pointed out before, scoring rules appear to be the paradigm of the positional approach to voting theory. In what follows we define this class of rules, which encloses well-known voting rules such as plurality, antiplurality and Borda rules, among others. Then, we will show that all of them are positional voting rules in the aforementioned sense, but it will be shown that the reverse is not true.
Now, suppose that voters' preferences over the alternatives are linear orders (i.e., weak orders where ties among distinct alternatives are avoided), gathered in a profile R ∈ L(X) m . Given a scoring vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), for each voter, Definition 9. Given a scoring vector s of dimension n, the scoring rule associated with s is the mapping The following cases give the scoring rules associated with various voting rules appearing in the literature.
• k-approval voting 7 , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}: s = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0), with k 1's. As important specific cases of this, we have -Plurality: for k = 1, s = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
-Antiplurality: for k = n − 1, s = (1, . . . , 1, 0).
• Borda rule: s = (n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 1, 0).
• Best-worst voting rules 8 : s = (1, s, . . . , s, 0), with s ∈ (0, 1).
Note that the excluded cases s = 0 and s = 1 would correspond again to plurality and antiplurality, respectively.
7 Notice that while k-approval voting is a scoring rule, approval voting (where each voter can approve of as many alternatives as wished) is not. However, it can be understood as a flexible scoring rule following the extended framework proposed by Baharad and Nitzan [1] . 8 Best-worst voting rules were introduced and axiomatically characterized in the scoring context by García-Lapresta et al. [22] .
Given the scoring rule associated with the scoring vector (s 1 , . . . , s n ), a, b ∈ R such that a > 0, the new scoring rule associated with the scoring vector (s 1 , . . . , s n ), where s i = as i + b for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is equivalent to the previous one, in the sense that they provide the same social outcomes. In this way, every scoring vector (s 1 , . . . , s n ) can be normalized, i.e., it is equivalent to (s 1 , . . . , s n ) with s 1 = 1 and s n = 0, by simply taking
For n = 4, the set of normalized scoring vectors
can be identified with the triangle {(s, t)
et al. [20] ). As shown in Figure 2 , the vertices of the triangle, (0, 0), (1, 0) and (1, 1), correspond to plurality, 2-approval voting and antiplurality, respectively; the baricenter of the triangle, with ϕ s (i) = 1 − s i for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It is easy to see that A s is an aggregation function on P m l . We also have
Hence, As = s and, consequently, the scoring rule associated with s coincides with the positional voting rule associated with A s . Now we will show that our positional approach actually does extend the scoring context. We mean that, although sharing similar patterns, it is not true that every positional voting rule associated with an aggregation function can be represented by a scoring rule (in the sense that both provide the same social order).
Example 2. Consider the profile given by
where the associated position matrix is 
OWA-generated positional voting rules
Taking into account some of the OWA operators mentioned above, we obtain positional voting rules which are connected to (or even replicate) well-known procedures appearing in the literature:
• The arithmetic mean as aggregation function induces the Borda rule.
And it is worth mentioning that the arithmetic mean is also the basis for the Range Voting method (Smith [43] ), in a decisional context where the alternatives receive numerical assessments one by one.
• The median instead of the arithmetic mean, and linguistic terms instead of numerical values, are used in the Majority Judgment voting system in-9 This is an archimedean-type property which states that if two disjoint sets of voters U and V select x and y as winners, respectively, then x should be a winner for the superset (nU ) ∪ V for n sufficiently large, where (nU ) means n copies of those voters and their votes.
Clearly, as exposed, this is not fulfilled by the maximin voting rule.
troduced by Balinski and Laraki [3, 4] . Extensions of this procedure using centered OWA operators (Yager [48] ) and distances appear in García-Lapresta and Martínez-Panero [23] and in Falcó and García-Lapresta [17] , respectively. Again, in a different scenario, Bucklin's method selects the candidates with highest median ranking as winners (see Tideman [44] and
Felsenthal [18] ), and similarly Basset and Persky [5] also proposed to select the alternative with best median evaluation (see also Laslier [33] , who has coined the term maxmed for this voting scheme).
• The maximum leads to a voting rule in which each alternative is evaluated according to the worst reached position. Those with the best assigned value are then elected. Such a maximin voting rule, which advocates the maximin principle of normative economics 10 , is called fallback bargaining
11
by Brams and Kilgour [9] . It has been characterized in the voting context by Congar and Merlin [13] (see also Llamazares and Peña [36] ).
The same underlying idea appears in the leximin voting system proposed by Laslier [32] (see also Laslier [33] ), and in the Simpson-Kramer method (see Levin and Nalebuff [34] ), although in different decisional frameworks.
Furthermore, the procedure obtained through the maximum as aggregation operator is also related to the Coombs method (where the alternative with the largest number of last positions is sequentially withdrawn), as well as to the antiplurality rule (see Baharad and Nitzan [2] and Congar and Merlin [13] ).
• The minimum entails a voting rule called maximax 12 by Congar and 10 Rawls [40, p. 328]: "the basic structure is perfectly just when the prospects of the least fortunate are as great as they can be". 11 Concretely, the maximin rule corresponds to the case of fallback bargaining with unanimity, also called Kant-Rawls social compromise after Hurwicz and Sertel [29] . 12 The apparent discordance leading the maximum to the maximin voting rule, as well as the minimum to the maximax, relies on our positional approach where, contrary to the scoring context, the smallest value is associated with the best position, as pointed out before. It is Merlin [13] , also characterized by them. Its conception is similar to that of the Hare rule, also known as alternative vote (where the alternative with the fewest first positions is sequentially withdrawn). It is also related to the most used (and criticized) voting system: plurality rule (see Laslier [32] and Congar and Merlin [13] ).
• The mid-range is related to the basic 1-best-1-worst voting rule (see García-Lapresta et al. [22] ). Consider the profile given by
The result under plurality rule is x 1 ∼ x 2 ∼ x 3 , and it is easy to check that this social order is also the same under the OWA-generated positional voting rule associated with the weighting vector (0, 0, 1), i.e., the maximax rule.
On the other hand, consider the new profile also worth to note in what follows that in the scoring context there are as many scores as alternatives, whereas in the positional scenario, when dealing with OWA operators, there are as many weights as voters.
Now plurality rule gives x 1 x 2 x 3 and, after some computation, the same social order can be obtained through every OWA-generated positional voting rule associated with any weighting vector (α, β, 1 − α − β) such that
Thus, these two profiles show that, even when existing weights associated with scores, they could have not common values. Concretely, in words referred to our example, being the first weighting vector incompatible with those obtained to capture plurality in the second profile, it can be argued that there not exists "the" OWA-generated positional voting rule associated with plurality (similar reasons for the antiplurality rule also stand). x 2 x 1 when s > 0. However, if maxmed were applied, then the result would be x 3 ∼ x 2 x 1 , incompatible with any of these scoring rules.
Extended notions
Sometimes it is necessary to take into account a variable electorate (for instance, as mentioned, to deal with the clonation or appearance of new voters, as happening in Example 2). This is the reason why we introduce some extended notions of those already defined throughout the paper.
Definition 10. An extended voting rule is a mapping 
Duplication
Here we formally introduce the aforementioned clone irrelevance property which, broadly speaking, requires that new voters replicating the same preferences of already existing voters will not affect the social outcome. At first sight such statement might seem a vulneration of the very essence of democracy, but it can make sense in some contexts. For example, in bargaining, when the above mentioned fallback method is used to find a compromise among the bargainers because they "fall back in lockstep to less and less preferred positions until they agree on outcome" (see Brams and Kilgour [9] ). But it also make sense in voting scenarios such as the Internet, where agents can cast their votes more than one time 13 ; or wherever that, rather than merely the total amount of votes, different currents of opinion or electoral bodies (such as minorities) should be taken into account.
This property appears as duplication in Congar and Merlin [13] , where they consider this axiom in order to capture situations of complete ignorance in some voting contexts (see references therein) and characterize the maximin procedure.
Definition 12. An extended voting rule F satisfies duplication if
for every profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R i , . . . , R m ) ∈ W (X) m and every i ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
A characterization result
It is interesting to find those procedures satisfying duplication, and the fol- 
where the associated position matrix is ). Now suppose that voter 1 is replicated, becoming the new situation
14 Notice that, in the previous argument, α does not need to be rational. However, as pointed out by Fagin and Wimmers [16] "in some situations we have to restrict our attention to rational weights". One of these situations naturally arises when "we simply allow multiple copies of voters", which is exactly our case. 
The aggregated positions for the selected alternatives would be
so that x 1 ∼ A x 2 , being A the voting rule corresponding to any EOWA with such weights.
But now, if we replicate any subset of voters becoming the new weights β = α and hence 1 − β = 1 − α, then the new aggregated positions would be
so that x 1 ∼ A x 2 does not hold. Hence, if lateral weights change from one dimension to another, duplication fails.
In conclusion, under duplication we obtain the class of weighting triangles 
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As specific cases we have:
• α = 1: maximum (maximin rule),
• α = 0: minimum (maximax rule),
• α = 0.5: mid-range.
It is worth mentioning that duplication is related to the Hurwicz criterion
[28] used in decision making under complete uncertainty, where the value of a decision is a convex combination of its lowest possible expected value (pessimistic assessment) and of its highest one (optimistic assessment). On the other hand, although duplication might seem to be antidemocratic, Congar and Merlin [13] show that at least it is compatible with the basic democratic principle of anonymity and advocate it as a way "to protect the opinion of a minority against the will of the majority".
An illustrative example
Consider three voters that arrange three alternatives according to the following profile
with associated position matrix 
According to the possible values of α, the corresponding social orders are the following
As one could expect, different social orders appear depending on α.
In the following subsection we propose an integrating method to obtain a unified result for each alternative taking into account the different outcomes when α ranges from 0 to 1.
Overall positions and social order
For the general case with n alternatives and using in a first stage the po- Thus, the overall social order is x 3 x 2 x 1 .
In conclusion, for each α ∈ [0, 1] the corresponding positional voting rule associated with A w(α) only takes into account the best and worst positions for each alternative, yielding different social orders in each case. However, the possible criticism on the influence of the choice of α in the result can be mitigated under this overall approach, where a social order is obtained not corresponding with any predetermined α, but amalgamating all allowable values for this parameter.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a general framework for positional voting rules which includes all scoring rules as especial cases. To this aim, we need an aggregation process for obtaining a collective position from individual ones for each alternative. This is the reason why we have mainly used OWA operators, as they provide a comprehensive way to deal with this kind of information.
More concretely, we have analyzed how the maximum and the minimum OWA operators induce the so called maximin and maximax voting rules, respectively, recently characterized by Congar and Merlin [13] . Of course, these rules are not scoring rules (they satisfy duplication, a property radically opposed to the continuity verified by the scoring rules) although all of them share interesting features due to their positional nature. A comprehensive diagram showing our knowledge of the logical relationship among these rules appears in Figure 3 .
We have focused on the duplication property appearing in the above mentioned characterization. On our part, once introduced suitable extended notions with the arithmetic mean. However, a characterization of the family of scoring rules that are generated by OWA operators (in other words, the relationship among scores and weights) is to be found. Additionally, families of aggregation functions other than OWA operators, such as quasiarithmetic means, could be also taken into account.
